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Abstract I argue that attitude reports de re arise compositionally via two distinct
LF mechanisms. One mechanism allows the res to remain inside the embedded
clause syntactically, and does not treat the res as an argument of the attitude verb
semantically (Percus & Sauerland 2003, Ninan 2012). The other involves the res
semantically serving as an argument of the attitude verb, and syntactically occupying
a distinctive res position external to the embedded clause (Heim 1994). I show that
both LF mechanisms are made use of by a single natural language, Nez Perce, and
that Nez Perce allows the distinctive res position to be filled by covert movement
(res-movement) or by base-generation.
Keywords: attitude reports, de re, res movement, concept generators, prolepsis, covert
movement, syntax-semantics interface, semantic fieldwork, semantic variation
1 De re vs. de dicto
Attitude reports de dicto involve a relation (at a world) between an individual and a
proposition, where the proposition characterizes the individual’s beliefs, or desires,
or memories, and so on. On the classic analysis from Hintikka (1969), the role of
a verb like believe is to indicate that the worlds in the proposition (conceiving of
this as a set of worlds) form a superset of those compatible with what the believer
believes, i.e. her (doxastic) alternatives. Thus for a sentence like (1) we may provide
the propositional meaning in (2).1
(1) Mary believes that the star of ‘Black Swan’ is a famous actress.
(2) λw.∀w′ ∈ DOXw(Mary)[the star of ‘B.S.’ in w′ is a famous actress in w′]
From a compositional perspective, this analysis is straightforward. The structure of
(1) provides believe with two syntactic arguments – the CP that the star of ‘Black
* I would like to thank my Nez Perce teachers Florene Davis and Bessie Scott for their patient help,
and Seth Cable, Ivano Caponigro, Gennaro Chierchia, Itamar Francez, Danny Fox, Irene Heim, Sarah
Murray, David Pesetsky, Norvin Richards, Roger Schwarzschild, Yael Sharvit, Will Starr, and (other)
audience members at SALT 28, NELS 47, UC Berkeley, UC Irvine, MIT, and Chicago.
1 Here and following, for all individuals a and worlds w, let DOXw(a) be the set of worlds compatible
with what a believes in w (i.e. a’s doxastic alternatives in w).
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Swan’ is a famous actress and the DP Mary. Let us suppose for simplicity that the
latter is directly referential. As for the CP, it expresses a proposition, (3a), which
provides the first argument to the verb denotation, (3b).
(3) a. Jthat the star of ‘Black Swan’ is a famous actressK =
λw. the star of ‘Black Swan’ in w is a famous actress in w
b. Jbelievede dictoK = λ p.λy.λw.∀w′ ∈ DOXw(y)[pw′]
Attitude reports de re involve more complexity. Consider, for instance, the
analysis of (1) on a reading where the star of ‘Black Swan’ is read de re. (How to
recognize this reading? It is one where Mary need not assent to the sentence The
star of ‘Black Swan’ is a famous actress; in fact, she need not ever have heard of
this movie or be aware of who stars in it. Given that the star of ‘Black Swan’ is
in fact Natalie Portman, Mary need only believe that Portman is a famous actress.
When we reason from Mary believes that Portman is a famous actress to Mary
believes the star of ‘Black Swan’ is a famous actress, our reasoning depends on the
de re interpretation of the embedded subject in both cases.) A simple variant of the
analysis just given, but with wide scope for the DP the star of ‘Black Swan’, will not
suffice to capture the semantic properties of this reading (Quine 1956). Suppose, for
instance, we posit an LF wherein this DP moves into the matrix clause, as in (4a),
yielding the overall sentence meaning in (4b) (identical to (2b) but for the world
variable associated to the res DP the star of ‘Black Swan’):
(4) a. Wide-scope LF:
[the star of ‘Black Swan’ ] λx1 Mary believes [ x1 is a famous actress].
b. λw.∀w′ ∈ DOXw(Mary). the star of ‘B.S.’ in w is a famous actress in w′
The shortcoming of this analysis lies in its failure to account for cases of ‘double
vision’ (Klein 1979), i.e. instances in which an attitude holder thinks of a res in
multiple, potentially incompatible ways. Here let us note that the DP the star of
‘Black Swan’ denotes (in our world) the same individual as do the names Natalie
Portman and Natalie Herschlag. Yet our friend Mary may think of this one individual
in different ways under various different guises. Suppose, for instance, that under
the guise ‘person named Natalie Portman’, Mary thinks de re of the actual star of
‘Black Swan’ that she is a famous actress. This does not exclude that, under the
guise ‘person named Natalie Herschlag’, Mary also thinks de re of the actual star of
‘Black Swan’ that she not is a famous actress. (Perhaps Mary thinks of Herschlag
as an unproductive psychology researcher.) The upshot? There is no simple fact of
the matter concerning whether Mary thinks de re that the star of ‘Black Swan’ is a
famous actress. It matters how Mary thinks of that individual.
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Doing justice to this conclusion seems to require adopting an analysis of de
re truth conditions that features descriptions or similar technology (e.g. modes of
presentation, acquaintance relations, guises, vivid names). In the spirit of Kaplan
(1968), Lewis (1979), and much following work, an analysis of (1) on its de re
reading may be given as in (5):2
(5) λw. f (w) = the star of ‘Black Swan’ in w∧Suitablew( f ,Mary)
∧∀w′ ∈ DOXw(Mary). f (w′) is a famous actress in w′
Here f is a free variable to be resolved contextually.3 As desired, the proposed
truth-conditions allow that both sentences in (6) might be true without Mary having
inconsistent beliefs; this may be so, for instance, if the free variable is resolved to f1
for sentence (6a) but to f2 for sentence (6b), where f1, f2 are as given in (7).
(6) a. Mary believes the star of ‘Black Swan’ is a famous actress.
b. Mary believes the star of ‘Black Swan’ is not a famous actress.
(7) a. f1 = λw.ιx[ Mary describes x as ‘Natalie Portman’ in w]
b. f2 = λw.ιx[ Mary describes x as ‘the fourth author of Frontal Lobe Acti-
vation during Object Permanence’ in w]
And so we arrive at the compositional question. How do de re reports come to have
truth-conditions of this form?
As for most questions in semantics, we might pursue either a narrow answer
or a broad one. A narrow answer, in the sense I have in mind, is one that (perhaps
implicitly) restricts the domain of inquiry to English sentences of the general type in
(1). (I have indeed already given only a narrow answer to the question of how de
dicto reports are composed.) A broad answer is one that opens up the field of inquiry
to how natural languages in general convey de re sentence meanings. In this case,
as I will argue, the answer that we get from English turns out to reveal only part of
the larger picture about how language in general works. There are compositional
pathways to de re that are made use of in natural language even though they are not
made use of for English sentences like (1) (or maybe – more radically – they are not
used anywhere in English). Given that (1) does of course have a de re reading, a
consequence is that there is more than one compositional pathway to de re available
in natural language.
I will defend a picture that recognizes two distinct options made available by
natural language for the compositional makeup of de re reports. The first option
2 On the suitability condition, see Kaplan (1968). For critical discussion of the descriptivist approach
to de re in general, see Ninan (2012).
3 This follows Heim (1994) and Maier (2009). Alternatively, f may be bound by an existential
quantifier, as in Lewis (1979) and Cresswell & von Stechow (1982), in which case the particular
functions in (7) serve to witness the quantification for (6).
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(call it ‘Method 1’) posits LFs wherein the element to be read de re – the res –
semantically does not serve as an argument of the attitude verb, and syntactically
remains inside the embedded clause. This is in keeping with the current consensus
view about the de re reading of English sentences like (1) (Percus & Sauerland 2003,
Anand 2006, Ninan 2012, Charlow & Sharvit 2014, Pearson 2015). The second
option (call it ‘Method 2’) posits LFs wherein the res semantically does serve as an
argument of the attitude verb, and syntactically occupies a distinctive res position
external to the embedded clause. This follows analyses from Heim (1994).
The nature of my argument will be as follows: I will demonstrate that two LFs
(resulting from three distinct types of syntactic derivation) give rise to de re reports
in a single natural language. As foreshadowed already, that language will not be
English (for which I will not quibble with the current consensus that Method 2
is inappropriate). Instead, it will be a Sahaptian language, Nez Perce. In the rest
of the paper, I first give a very brief introduction to Nez Perce, highlighting some
properties relevant to this investigation (§2). I then discuss three sentence types used
to express de re reports in Nez Perce: prolepsis (§3), covert raising to object (§4),
and syntactically simplex CP complementation (§5). For the first two cases, I will
argue for a Method 2 analysis (and thus, implicitly, for a plurality of compositional
pathways to de re across languages). In the last case, I will argue for Method 1, and
so for a plurality of compositional pathways to de re within a single language.
2 Nez Perce: some background
Nez Perce is a highly endangered Sahaptian language spoken in Idaho, Washington,
and Oregon, USA. The data in this paper come from fieldwork conducted with two
speakers, Bessie Scott and Florene Davis, on the Nez Perce Reservation in Lapwai,
Idaho, over an approximately ten-year period. Descriptions of various aspects of Nez
Perce grammar may be found in Aoki 1970, 1994, Rude 1985, 1992, 1999, Crook
1999, and Deal 2010a,b, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016a,b,c, 2017a,b, 2018, To appear,
among other sources. Here, I will focus selectively on aspects of the language which
prove especially relevant for understanding the composition of its attitude reports.
Nez Perce has rich systems of case and agreement, which work together to
distinguish transitive from intransitive clauses. The case system shows a tripartite
ergative alignment: intransitive subjects are NOMinative, but transitive subjects are
ERGative (and objects are ACCusative) (Deal 2010b,a, 2016b). Verb agreement is on
a nominative-accusative basis. All clauses have subject agreement; transitive clauses
are distinctive in also showing object agreement. Overt agreement affixes are used
to index 3rd person arguments and plurals (see Deal 2015 for further details):
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(8) Agreement prefixes on verbs
hi- 3rd person subject pe- plural subject
’e- 3rd person object nees- plural object
pee- 3rd person subject and object
Like the agreement system, the pronominal paradigm of Nez Perce distinguishes
person and number (singular vs. plural). However, as in many languages, pronouns
are normally null (pro). Silent pro is possible in all argument positions and is avoided
only in cases of focus, modification, or coordination (Deal 2010b) or cliticization
(Deal 2016b). Throughout this paper, null arguments are marked as ‘pro’, with the
gloss line reflecting the person and number features conveyed by the verbal inflection
or the speaker’s translation. While Nez Perce word order is quite flexible at the
clausal level, I follow a general convention of placing pros in SVO order.
Attitude verbs in Nez Perce are relatively limited in number, and can be divided
into two groups depending on their basic complementation pattern. A first group
– neki ‘think’, cuukwe ‘know’, and hi ‘say/tell’ – combines with a finite clausal
complement which is not explicitly marked for subordination.4
(9) Beth
Beth.NOM
hi-hi-ce
3SUBJ-say-IMPERF
/
/
hi-neki-se
3SUBJ-think-IMPERF
/
/
hi-cuukwe-ce
3SUBJ-know-IMPERF
[ Jill-nim
[ Jill-ERG
pee-siw’e-nu’
3/3-not.recognize-FUT
Matt-ne
Matt-ACC
]
]
Beth says / thinks / knows that Jill won’t recognize Matt.
A second (somewhat larger) group of verbs combines with a complement that in
certain respects resembles a relative clause (cp. Caponigro & Polinsky 2011).
The complement begins with nominative relative pronoun yoxˆ followed by relative
complementizer ke. This group of verbs is composed primarily of emotive factives,
e.g. lilooy ‘be happy’, q’eese’ ‘be sad’, cicwaay ‘be surprised’, etc.5
(10) Naaqc
one.NOM
hi-q’eese’-ce
3SUBJ-be.sad-IMPERF
[
[
yoxˆ
RP.NOM
ke
C
hi-ckilii-n-a
3SUBJ-go.home-P-REM.PAST
qiiwn
old.man.NOM
].
]
Someone is sad that the old man went home.
4 Glossing abbreviations: 3/3 3rd person subject + 3rd person object, 3SUBJ 3rd person subject, 3OBJ
3rd person object, ACC accusative, C complementizer, CL clitic, DESID desiderative, ERG ergative,
FUT future, IMPERF imperfective, IMPERF.PL imperfective + plural subject, NEG negation, NOM
nominative, O.PL plural object, P perfect/perfective aspect, PRES present tense, REC.PAST recent past
tense, REM.PAST remote past tense, RP relative pronoun, S.PL plural subject, TAM tense/aspect/mood,
µ functional head present in possessor raising (Deal 2013), 1SG (etc.) 1st person singular (etc.).
5 Note that VS order in the embedded clause in (10) is neither necessary in this complement type, nor
unique to it; Nez Perce intransitives generally allow both VS and SV orders.
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While the bracketed material in (10) is similar to a relative clause, the structures
diverge in whether they require a gap and permit an external head. A simple relative
clause is shown in (11). (For more on Nez Perce relatives, see Deal 2016a.)
(11) qiiwn
old.man.NOM
[
[
yoxˆ
RP.NOM
ke
C
hi-ckilii-n-a
3SUBJ-go.home-P-REM.PAST
_
_
]
]
the old man who went home
3 De re by prolepsis
3.1 Basics
We now turn to a first compositional pathway to de re reporting in Nez Perce. The
focus here will be on two verbs, neki ‘think’ and cuukwe ‘know’, which as we just
saw both occur in a canonical complementation pattern with a finite non-relative
CP. This is shown in (12) for neki ‘think’, the verb with which I will exemplify
throughout this paper. (The patterns demonstrated also hold for cuukwe ‘know’.)
(12) Taamsas
Taamsas.NOM
hi-neki-se
3SUBJ-think-IMPERF
[
[
’aayat-onm
woman-ERG
hi-naas-wapayata-ca
3SUBJ-O.PL-help-IMPERF
mamay’as-na
children-ACC
].
]
Taamsas thinks a lady is helping the children.
In (12), like in (9), the matrix clause is clearly intransitive: the subject is nominative,
and there is no object agreement on the verb ‘think’. This provides a notable contrast
with a second type of complementation pattern possible with ‘think’ and ‘know’. In
this second pattern, the verb takes an accusative object and the embedded clause is
required to contain a bound element (typically pro), as in (13). The matrix clause in
(13) is transitive: note the accusative object (bolded), ergative subject, and presence
of subject and object agreement on the verb (portmanteau form pee ‘3 on 3’).
(13) Taamsas-nim
Taamsas-ERG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPERF
’aayat-ona
woman-ACC
[
[
pro
3SG
hi-naas-wapayata-ca
3SUBJ-O.PL-help-IMPERF
mamay’as-na
children-ACC
].
]
Taamsas thinks a lady is helping the children.
In presenting example (13), I have bracketed the embedded clause in a way that
excludes the accusative DP. Why? Because this accusative DP behaves in several
respects like an element of the matrix clause. This is certainly so in terms of its
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case/agreement behavior: it shows accusative case, triggering ergative on the matrix
subject, and it controls object agreement on the attitude verb. (Accordingly, when
the accusative DP is plural in (14), we will see the attitude verb inflected with
plural object agreement prefix nees-.) More conclusively, the accusative DP behaves
like a matrix argument in terms of its word order possibilities. Nez Perce clausal
word order is generally flexible, allowing both SOV and SVO orders (among other
options). No surprise, then, that the accusative DP may surface anywhere in the
matrix clause, including between the matrix subject and verb:
(14) ’Aayat-onm
woman-ERG
mamay’as-na
children-ACC
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-IMPERF
[
[
watiisx
1.day.away
pro
3SG
hi-pa-paay-no’
3SUBJ-S.PL-arrive-FUT
].
]
The woman thinks the children will arrive tomorrow.
But it cannot surface in a position which belongs unambiguously to the embedded
clause, such as to the right of an embedded adverb:
(15) * ’Aayat-onm
woman-ERG
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-IMPERF
[
[
watiisx
1.day.away
mamay’as-na
children-ACC
hi-pa-paay-no’
3SUBJ-S.PL-arrive-FUT
].
]
Intended: the woman thinks the children will arrive tomorrow.
At this point I will introduce some terminology that looks ahead to the structural
analysis I will defend. I will argue that sentences like (13) and (14) represent
prolepsis (Takano 2003; Davies 2005; Salzmann 2006, 2017a,b): the object of ‘think’
is base-generated in the matrix clause and connected indirectly to the embedded
clause, in a way to be made precise. Accordingly, I will refer to the matrix accusative
DP as the proleptic object. What I want to now show is that the prolepsis structure
comes with consequences for the way that the proleptic object is interpreted: the
proleptic object must be read de re.
3.2 Semantics of prolepsis
Let us first consider cases in which prolepsis is felicitous. These include contexts
clearly supporting a de re reading of the proleptic object, such as (16). Here Mary
holds a de re belief about Calvin, and ascribes magpie-catching to him under a
suitable description, but would not assent to the sentence Calvin caught a magpie.
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(16) Context: My neighbor Mary sees a cat catching a magpie. It turns out it was
my cat, Calvin, but Mary doesn’t know that. She just tells me about the fight
and what the cat looked like. When I get home, Calvin is there and he’s all
dirty and messed up. To explain what happened I say:
Mary-nim
Mary-ERG
Calvin-ne
Calvin-ACC
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-TAM
[
[
pro
3SG
pee-cepeqick-e
3/3-catch-TAM
’ek’eex-ne ].
magpie-ACC]
Mary thinks Calvin caught a magpie.
Similarly, the sensible reading of (17) is the de re reading, according to which the
individuals in question mistakenly believe, de re of this dog, that it is not a dog at all
(but rather a wolf). Here the proposition required for a de dicto analysis would be
empty (as there is no world in which a dog is not a dog) and so the de dicto reading
would be true iff the individuals in question have inconsistent beliefs (in which case
their doxastic alternatives are also /0).
(17) Context: There is a friendly dog, but it scares people because they think it’s a
wolf, just based on how it looks. When I point to it I say:
pro
3PL
pee-nek-six
3/3-think-IMPERF.PL
ki-nye
this-ACC
ciq’aamqal-a,
dog-ACC
[
[
pro
3SG
hii-wes
3SUBJ-be.PRES
himiin
wolf.NOM
weet’u
not
ciq’aamqal
dog.NOM
].
]
They think that this dog is a wolf, not a dog.
And of course it should be mentioned that prolepsis is perfectly felicitous in a more
run-of-the-mill scenario in which an individual simply forms a de re belief about
another individual. This is the case in the context for (18), where Mary forms a
suspicion about one particular dog – the one she sees approach her food.
(18) Context: There is a BBQ with a lot of food on different tables. People are
there with their families and their dogs. Mary leaves her food on one table
and sees a dog come up to it. Next thing she knows, the food is missing.
Meli-nim
Mary-ERG
ciq’aamqal-na
dog-ACC
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-TAM
[
[
pro
3SG
pee-p-eny-e
3/3-eat-µ-TAM
pro
3SG
hipt].
food]
Mary thinks a dog ate her food.
These scenarios contrast with cases in which the proleptic object cannot be read
de re. In accordance with Fodor’s (1970) two distinctions, such scenarios might be
divided into those featuring opaque interpretation of the DP (with the world variable
of its NP restrictor bound by the attitude predicate) and those featuring non-specific
interpretation of the DP (with its scope under the attitude predicate). Let us consider
each case in turn. Nez Perce certainly allows DPs in attitude reports to be read
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opaquely: a speaker can, for instance, report another individual’s views about white
ravens without committing herself to the existence of such creatures. We see in this
in (19), a case of canonical (i.e. non-proleptic) complementation, which might be
analyzed as in (20):
(19) Context: John doesn’t know that all ravens are black. He thinks that a white
raven was flying around outside.
pro
3SG
hi-neki-se
3SUBJ-think-TAM
[
[
xˆayxˆayxˆ
white.NOM
qooqoxˆ
raven.NOM
hi-weyixnik-saqa.
3SUBJ-fly.around-TAM
]
]
He thinks a white raven was flying around.
(20) λw.∀w′ ∈ DOXw(J).∃x[x is a white raven in w′∧ x was flying around in w′]
Here xˆayxˆayxˆ qooqoxˆ ‘a white raven’ is read opaquely; its world variable is bound
by the attitudinal modal quantification. Notably, if this DP appears as a proleptic
object, the sentence becomes infelicitous:
(21) (Same context)
# pro
3SG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPERF
xˆayxˆayxˆ-na
white-ACC
qoqooxˆ-na
raven-ACC
[
[
pro
3SG
hi-weyixnik-sa-qa.
3SUBJ-fly.around-IMPERF-REC.PAST
]
]
The judgment of infelicity is replicated in other sentences featuring proleptic objects
muu wepteesnin ‘a winged cow’ and (in a context which establishes that the speaker
does not have an older brother) ’iinim piiyep ‘my older brother’. In common across
these cases is the speaker’s inability to make an existential commitment regarding
the NP predicate: in our world there are no white ravens, winged cows, or brothers
of a brotherless speaker. This absence of existential commitment leads to infelicity
only when the DPs in question appear in the proleptic object position, not when they
appear internal to the CP in canonical complementation. The generalization is that
DPs in the proleptic object position cannot be read opaquely.
The opaque readings considered above are all also non-specific readings: the
attitudinal quantification outscopes the existential quantifier over individuals. We
next consider cases which share this scopal configuration but which do not require
opaque interpretation (because there is no problem with an existential commitment
regarding the NP predicate). One such case is (22):
(22) Context: Mary babysits a pair of identical twins, Sarah and Suzie. They look
the same and they dress the same and Mary can’t tell them apart. One day,
one of the twins decides to play a mean trick on Mary and hides in the closet
instead of playing in the yard. Mary gets scared because she thinks one of
the twins is missing, but she can’t tell which one.
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Mary
Mary.NOM
hi-ckaaw-na
3SUBJ-be.scared-TAM
’etke
because
pro
3SG
hi-neki-se
3SUBJ-think-TAM
[ naaqc-pa-ma
[ one-from-PL.NOM
lepe’eyepu-pe-me
twins-from-PL.NOM
hi-peeleey-ne
3SUBJ-go.missing-TAM
]
]
Mary got scared because she thought one of the twins was missing.
Crucial here is that there is no particular twin who Mary thinks is missing. (She
does not think that Sarah is missing. She does not think that Suzie is missing.) Thus
(22) has at least one of the interpretations in (23), both being acceptable in context.
(In this scenario, there is presumably no difference in who counts as a twin in the
world of evaluation versus in Mary’s doxastic alternatives, making it difficult to tell
whether the sentence has only one of these readings or in fact both.)
(23) a. Non-specific opaque:
λw.∀w′ ∈ DOXw(Mary). ∃x[x is a twin in w′∧ x is missing in w′]
b. Non-specific transparent:
λw.∀w′ ∈ DOXw(Mary). ∃x[x is a twin in w∧ x is missing in w′]
Notably, prolepsis is ruled out in this type of context, revealing that neither non-
specific reading is available for the proleptic object naaqcpamana ‘one of them’.
(24) Context: same as (22)
# Mary
Mary.NOM
hi-ckaaw-na
3SUBJ-be.scared-TAM
’etke
because
pro
3SG
naaqc-pa-ma-na
one-from-PL-ACC
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPERF
[
[
pro
3SG
hi-peeleey-n-e
3SUBJ-go.missing-P-REM.PAST
]
]
Given the absence of opaque readings attested above, such data are particularly
informative regarding non-specific transparent readings (i.e. “third readings”), e.g.
(23b). Such readings are not available for proleptic objects in Nez Perce. In (25)-(26),
we see further evidence of this restriction in a case where the non-specific reading is
heavily favored by world knowledge. Normally, a person who fears mosquito bites
sees any and all mosquitoes as equally threatening; there is no particular individual
mosquito m whose bite is specifically feared. The non-specific reading may be
expressed in a non-proleptic structure, like we saw above in (22):
(25) Qiiwn
old.man.NOM
hi-neki-se
3SUBJ-think-IMPERF
[
[
waawa-nm
mosquito-ERG
pee-ke’np-u’
3/3-bite-FUT
pro
3SG
c’alawi
if
pro
3SG
’emt-kex
outside-to
hi-kiy-u’
3SUBJ-go-FUT
]
]
The old man thinks a mosquito might bite him if he went outside.
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But it cannot be expressed with proleptic object waawana ‘a mosquito’:
(26) # Qiiwn-im
old.man-ERG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPERF
waawa-na
mosquito-ACC
[
[
pro
3SG
pee-ke’np-u’
3/3-bite-FUT
pro
3SG
c’alawi
if
pro
3SG
’emt-kex
outside-to
hi-kiy-u’
3SUBJ-go-FUT
]
]
We find overall that the reading enforced on the proleptic object is what we might
call ‘classic de re’:6 the quantificational force associated with the proleptic object
must have scope over the attitude verb (yielding a specific reading, in Fodor’s terms),
and the NP restrictor of the proleptic object DP must be evaluated independently of
the modal quantification (yielding a transparent reading, in Fodor’s terms).
3.3 The composition of prolepsis clauses
How are prolepsis clauses composed, such that they impose de re requirements?
To answer this question it will be necessary to return to certain syntactic questions
that have so far been left unresolved. We have seen that the res DP occupies a position
in the matrix clause in the surface form. Is this position obtained by movement
from the embedded clause, as perhaps we might expect on some form of a modern
(description-incorporating) scope/QR approach to de re (e.g. Keshet 2010, Yalcin
2015)? There are two broad classes of argument against this type of analysis (and,
conversely, in favor of a base-generation alternative).
First are issues of undergeneration. Movement analyses predict that the relation-
ship between the proleptic object and its corresponding embedded argument position
should be subject to locality constraints and island effects. This prediction is not
borne out: the thematic position associated with the matrix accusative DP may be
anywhere in the embedded clause, including inside an island. In (27), we see this
for a relative clause island. (On the islandhood of relative clauses in Nez Perce, see
Deal (2016a).) The judgment can also be replicated in other island configurations,
e.g. when-clauses (exemplified in (52) below).
(27) pro
1SG
’aayat-ona
woman-ACC
’e-neki-se,
3OBJ-think-IMPERF,
[CP
[CP
[
[
samxˆ
shirt.NOM
yoxˆ
RP.NOM
ke
C
pro
3SG
ha-ani- /0-ya
3SUBJ-make-P-REM.PAST
]
]
hii-wes
3SUBJ-be.PRES
sayaq’ic
pretty
]
]
I think the shirt that the woman made is pretty.
lit. ≈ I think the woman that the shirt she made is pretty.
6 The term is intended to distinguish the reading in question from the more general case of what von
Fintel & Heim (2011: 106) call ‘restrictor de re’, i.e. Fodorian ‘transparency’.
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On a movement analysis, the pro element boxed in this example would instead be
glossed as a trace or deleted copy. The relationship between that trace/copy and the
pronounced (bolded) DP is exceptional in spanning a relative clause boundary.
One might wish to respond to such data by simply granting that the movement
involved in de re readings is syntactically exceptional, immune to islands. But this
has the effect of worsening the second type of problem facing a movement approach,
which is a problem of overgeneration. Appeal to a general (island insensitive)
movement operation for de re fails to capture the specialness of neki ‘think’ and
cuukwe ‘know’. Only these two verbs allow prolepsis in Nez Perce. No prolepsis is
possible with verbs like q’eese’ ‘be sad’, whose complement resembles a relative
clause (cf. the well-formed, non-proleptic version in (10) above):
(28) * Naaqc-nim
one-ERG
pee-q’eese’-ce
3/3-be.sad-IMPERF
qiiwn-e
old.man-ACC
[
[
yoxˆ
RP.NOM
ke
C
pro
3SG
hi-ckilii-n-a
3SUBJ-go.home-P-REM.PAST
].
]
Intended: Someone is sad that the old manres went home.
It is difficult on a generalized movement-based analysis of de re to explain what goes
wrong here, in contrast to other examples featuring relative clauses such as (27).
A similar, perhaps even more challenging case for this view involves hi ‘say/tell’.
Complements to this verb are certainly not islands (see e.g. Deal 2016a: (2), (8b)),
and the verb may take an accusative object. However, the accusative object of this
verb is always interpreted as the addressee of telling, rather than as a res:
(29) Angel
Angel.NOM
hi-hi-ne
3SUBJ-say-TAM
[
[
Harold
Harold.NOM
hi-paaytoq-a.
3SUBJ-return.home-TAM
]
]
Angel said Harold went home.
(30) Angel-nim
Angel-ERG
Harold-ne
Harold-ACC
pee- /0-ne
3/3-say-TAM
[
[
pro
3SG
hi-paaytoq-a
3SUBJ-return.home-TAM
].
]
a. Impossible reading: Angel said Haroldres went home.
b. Possible but non-proleptic reading: Angel told Harold that pro went home.
For an example like (30), the movement approach overgenerates not strings but
meanings. Given that the verb need not take an addressee argument, as shown in
(29), and that the complement is not an island, it is not clear what could prohibit the
same type of movement here as in an example like (13).
Finally (returning to examples with neki ‘think’ for a third overgeneration prob-
lem), if de re readings generally involved movement, then more than one res should
be movable, resulting in multiple prolepsis. But this is sharply ungrammatical,
regardless of how the various objects are ordered or inflected for case:
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(31) * Taamsas-nim
Taamsas-ERG
Angel-na
Angel-ACC
Tatlo{-na/- /0}
Tatlo{-ACC/-NOM}
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPERF
[
[
pro
3SG
pee-tecukwe-ce
3/3-teach-IMPERF
pro
3SG
]
]
Intended: Taamsas thinks Angel is teaching Tatlo / Tatlo is teaching Angel.
The evidence to this point leads to three interim conclusions. First, the accusative
argument is base-generated in the matrix clause, rather than moving there; this
provides a straightforward explanation for the absence of island effects in (27).
Second, as we see in (31), there can only be one such argument; there is no multiple
prolepsis. Third, the verb determines whether or not such an argument is permissible:
it is for neki ‘think’ and cuukwe ‘know’, but not for hi ‘say/tell’ and q’eese’ ‘be sad’.
Taken together, these points suggest that the verb neki ‘think’ or cuukwe ‘know’,
as matter of its lexical entry, may combine with two individual-denoting arguments:
the attitude holder, and the res. Notably, these verbs may only compose with res
arguments in the prolepsis construction – not independently. For neki ‘think’, the
simply transitive (clause-less) version is ungrammatical:
(32) * Angel-nim
Angel-ERG
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-IMPERF
mamay’as-na.
children-ACC
Intended: Angel (had a) thought about the children.
Consultant comment: “That’s only half a sentence.”
For cuukwe ‘know’, there is a simply transitive version (cp. French connaître,
German kennen, English be acquainted), but the prolepsis version doesn’t entail it:
(33) Weet’u
NEG
pro
1SG
’e-cuukwe-ce
3OBJ-know-IMPERF
Curry-na,
Curry-ACC,
met’u
but
pro
1SG
pro
3SG
’e-cuukwe-ce
3OBJ-know-IMPERF
[
[
pro
3SG
hii-wes
3SUBJ-be.PRES
cikaw’is
good
poxpoxliy’awaat
ballplayer.NOM
]
]
I don’t know Curry, but I know that he is a good player.
This suggests that the lexical entries of ‘think’ and ‘know’ used in prolepsis con-
struction not only provide a res position, but also establish a connection between the
res and explicit clausal material.
Lexical entries that give attitude verbs exactly the right type of valence to account
for this behavior have been much discussed. The denotation in (34), for ‘think’,
draws on a proposal about temporal de re by Heim (1994: 155):
(34) Jneki de reK= λP.λx.λy.λw. f (w)= x∧Suitablew( f ,y).∀w′ ∈DOXw(y).Pw′( f (w′))
According to this denotation, the attitude verb has two individual arguments: the
attitude holder (y) and a res (x). It also has an intensional property argument (P),
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supplied by the embedded clause. The relation to the de re truth conditions in (5)
should be transparent. Context must provide a relation f . A report using this verb
denotation (at w) requires that f pick out the res in the evaluation world; that f
be suitable for the attitude holder (at the evaluation world); and that all worlds w′
compatible with what the attitude holder believes in w are such that f (w′) has the
intensional property in w′. The lexical entry in (34) can be contrasted with a simple
de dicto denotation for the verb, as in (35):
(35) Jneki de dictoKc,g = λ p.λy.λw.∀w′ ∈ DOXw(y).pw′
Here the clausal argument of the verb provides a proposition, rather than an inten-
sional property. One point captured by this difference is that in prolepsis, but not in
regular CP complementation, bound-pronoun-less CPs are impossible. Thus cases
of ‘gapless prolepsis’, as in (36), are ill-formed:7
(36) * ’Aayat-om
woman-ERG
sik’eem-ne
horse-ACC
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-IMPERF
[
[
’oykaloo-nm
everyone-ERG
puu-cet-’ipeecwi-six
3/3-ride-DESID-IMPERF.PL
maami-na
Appaloosa-ACC
].
]
Intended: the woman thinks regarding horses that everyone wants to ride
an Appaloosa.
Without a pronoun to bind in the embedded clause, the CP cannot (on pain of
vacuity) provide an intensional property as called for by the proleptic verb. (The
corresponding non-proleptic structures are of course perfect – the difference being
that the verb takes a propositional argument rather than a property-type one. See e.g.
(12) or (19).)
How does the proleptic complement CP end up property-type? For prolepsis
in German, which shows semantic behavior parallel to prolepsis in Nez Perce,
Salzmann (2006, 2017b) proposes an answer involving null operator movement: the
operator starts in the embedded pronoun position and covertly moves to the edge of
the embedded CP, forming an abstraction. A significant cost of this analysis is that
operator movement has to be island-insensitive: both in German and in Nez Perce,
the embedded pronoun position may be inside an island inside the embedded CP.
Salzmann nevertheless pursues this analysis on the grounds that it explains why, in
German, the CP complement of a proleptic verb is an island for further movement.
In Nez Perce, the cost still has to be paid (prolepsis is island-insensitive), but the
7 Here there is a clear difference with the English think regarding DP that CP construction, as the well-
formedness of the potential English correlate sentence here reveals. There are other such differences:
e.g., to my ear, I think regarding unicorns that they don’t exist is perfectly well-formed, suggesting
that no de re requirement is imposed on the English construction.
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benefit doesn’t accrue. CP complements aren’t islands in prolepsis, just like they
aren’t islands in ordinary complementation:
(37) Mawa
when
Tatlo-nm
Tatlo-ERG
Harold-ne
Harold-ACC
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-TAM
[
[
pro
3SG
hi-paay-no’
3SUBJ-arrive-FUT
t ]?
]
Wheni does Tatlo think Harold will arrive ti?
In view of the cost (and the absence of countervailing evidence of operator move-
ment), I will simply assume a base-generated abstractor at the edge of the embedded
CP (cp. Chierchia 1989).
With this final detail in place, we can now lay out the structure and interpretation
of prolepsis clauses. For sentence (16), repeated in (38), the VP-level LF is shown in
(39) (where, for clarity, I have taken the liberty of replacing Nez Perce words with
their English glosses). Given the verb denotation in (34), this returns (relative to a
contextual specification of f ) the propositional meaning in (40):
(38) Mary-nim
Mary-ERG
Calvin-ne
Calvin-ACC
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-TAM
[
[
pro
3SG
pee-cepeqick-e
3/3-catch-TAM
’ek’eex-ne ].
magpie-ACC]
Mary thinks Calvin caught a magpie.
(39) VP
CP
TP
pro1 caught a magpie
1
V
thinkde re
DPres
Calvin
DPatt holder
Mary
(40) λw. f (w)=Cal∧Suitablew( f ,M).∀w′ ∈DOXw(M). f (w′) caught a magpie in w′
Structure (39) clearly is a Method 2 LF, in the sense laid out in the introduction: it
treats the res as a semantic argument of the verb, occupying a dedicated syntactic
position for such arguments. This structure diverges from previous Method 2
proposals (e.g. Heim 1994) in treating the res position as one filled by base-generated
material, as opposed to material that is covertly moved. We might wonder if this
is generally necessary. Could covert movement of a DP into this position also be a
path to de re interpretation? In the next section, I will argue that the answer is yes.
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4 De re by covert raising
4.1 Basics
In addition to ordinary complementation and prolepsis, Nez Perce ‘think’ and
‘know’ reports also allow a third option, morphosyntactically intermediate between
the previous two. Here, as shown in (41) and (42), the matrix clause shows transitive
morphosyntax: the attitude holder DP appears in ergative case, and the attitude verb
hosts object agreement. However, there is no apparent gap or bound element in the
embedded clause, and no accusative matrix object. Instead, in these examples, plural
object agreement (nees-) indexes an argument that is either nominative or ergative.
In the examples in this section, I mark the element indexed by object agreement on
the attitude verb with a ⊕ symbol.
(41) Harold-nim
Harold-ERG
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-IMPERF
[
[
hitemenew’eet⊕
student.NOM
hi-wsiix
3SUBJ-be.PRES.PL
wiweepcux
smart
].
]
Harold thinks the students are smart.
(42) Taamsas-nim
Taamsas-ERG
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-IMPERF
[
[
mamay’as-nim⊕
children-ERG
poo-payata-six
3/3-help-IMPERF.PL
Angel-ne
Angel-ACC
].
]
Taamsas thinks the children are helping Angel.
Here I have bracketed the argument tracked by matrix object agreement, DP⊕, inside
the embedded clause. This reflects its behavior in terms of case and word order. In
terms of case, DP⊕ is nominative when it serves as the subject of an intransitive
lower clause (e.g. in (41)) but ergative when it serves as the subject of a transitive
lower clause (e.g. in (42)). In terms of word order, DP⊕ may freely surface to the
right of material belonging to the embedded clause, such as an embedded adverb,
(43); contrast prolepsis example (15).
(43) ’Aayat-onm
woman-ERG
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-IMPERF
[
[
watiisx
1.day.away
mamay’ac⊕
children.NOM
hi-pa-paay-no’
3SUBJ-S.PL-arrive-FUT
].
]
The woman thinks the children will arrive tomorrow.
In contrast, DP⊕ cannot surface to the left of the matrix verb: compare the ungram-
matical (44) with the grammatical prolepsis example (14).
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(44) * ’Aayat-onm
woman-ERG
mamay’ac⊕
children.NOM
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-IMPERF
[
[
watiisx
1.day.away
hi-pa-paay-no’
3SUBJ-S.PL-arrive-FUT
].
]
Intended: the woman thinks the children will arrive tomorrow.
Clearly, this is a different surface structure type than we find in prolepsis. In Deal
(2017b), I argued that this type of sentence reflects covert raising to object: DP⊕ is
base-generated in the embedded clause, and surfaces there, but nevertheless occupies
a matrix clause position at LF. The relevant movement is well-behaved A-movement,
sensitive to islands, A-intervention, and improper movement constraints. Where
we turn now is to the interpretation of such structures, where we will see again the
imposition of a de re requirement.
4.2 Semantics of covert raising
We begin, as for prolepsis, with contexts in which covert raising clauses are felicitous.
Like for prolepsis, these include a variety of cases in which the DP triggering object
agreement on the attitude verb (DP⊕) is read de re. The scenarios below reprise
those in (16), (17), and (18).
(45) Context: My neighbor Mary sees a cat catching a magpie. It turns out it was
my cat, Calvin, but Mary doesn’t know that. She just tells me about the fight
and what the cat looked like. When I get home, Calvin is there and he’s all
dirty and messed up. To explain what happened I say:
Mary-nim
Mary-ERG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-TAM
[
[
Calvin-nim⊕
Calvin-ERG
pee-cepeqick-e
3/3-catch-TAM
’ek’eex-ne
magpie-ACC
].
]
Mary thinks Calvin caught a magpie.
(46) Context: There is a friendly dog, but it scares people because they think it’s a
wolf, just based on how it looks. When I point to it I say:
Weet’u
NEG
’isii-nm
who-ERG
pee-nek-six
3/3-think-IMPERF.PL
[
[
kii
this
ciq’aamqal⊕
dog.NOM
hii-wes
3SUBJ-be.PRES
ciq’aamqal
dog.NOM
].
]
pro
3PL
pee-nek-six
3/3-think-IMPERF.PL
[
[
pro
3SG
hii-wes
3SUBJ-be.PRES
himiin
wolf.NOM
].
]
No one thinks this dog is a dog. They think it’s a wolf.
(47) Context: There is a BBQ with a lot of food on different tables. People are
there with their families and their dogs. Mary leaves her food on one table
and sees a dog come up to it. Next thing she knows, the food is missing.
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pee-nek-se
3/3-think-TAM
Meli-nim
Mary-ERG
[
[
ciq’aamqal-nim⊕
dog-ERG
pee-p-eny-e
3/3-eat-µ-TAM
pro
3SG
hipt
food
].
]
Mary thinks a dog ate her food.
These data show that DP⊕, like a proleptic object, may be read de re.
The interpretive parallel between prolepsis and covert raising continues in those
scenarios in which prolepsis is infelicitous: the infelicity remains in place if the
proleptic object is instead encoded syntactically as a covert raising DP⊕. As we
saw in (19), a speaker may report someone’s beliefs about white ravens (using a
canonical complementation structure) without making an existential commitment;
however, as we saw in (21), such commitment becomes necessary when xˆayxˆayxˆ
qooqoxˆ ‘a white raven’ is the proleptic object (and accordingly, given that white
ravens do not exist, the prolepsis sentence is infelicitous). In (48), we see the same
effect when xˆayxˆayxˆ qooqoxˆ ‘a white raven’ is not the proleptic object but DP⊕:
(48) Context: John doesn’t know that all ravens are black. He thinks that a white
raven was flying around outside.
# pro
3SG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPERF
[
[
xˆayxˆayxˆ
white.NOM
qooqoxˆ
raven.NOM
hi-weyixnik-sa-qa
3SUBJ-fly.around-IMPERF-REC.PAST
]
]
Intended: he thinks [a white raven]opaque was flying around.
Like for prolepsis, the infelicity recurs in sentences with other choices for DP⊕ that
do not support existential commitments, such as himeeq’is ciciyele picpic ‘a giant
purple cat’. This shows that DP⊕ may not be read opaquely.
Turning to questions of specificity (in Fodor’s sense), we find that covert raising
does not allow DP⊕ to take scope below the attitude verb. In the Hiding Twin
context discussed for (22), there is no particular twin who Mary thinks is missing.
Accordingly, naaqcpama ‘one of them’ cannot serve as DP⊕:
(49) Context: as in (22)
# Mary
Mary.NOM
hi-ckaaw-n-a
3SUBJ-be.scared-P-REM.PAST
’etke
because
pro
3SG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPRF
[ naaqc-pa-ma⊕
[ one-from-PL.NOM
hi-peeleey-n-e
3SUBJ-go.missing-P-REM.PAST
]
]
Intended: Mary got scared because she thought [one of them]nonspeci f ic
was missing.
The same infelicity appears in the Mosquito context, (25). Since there is no particular
mosquito whose bite is feared, waawanm ‘a mosquito’ cannot serve as DP⊕.
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(50) Context: Kunk’u haacwal ’imiit hiiwes, ’etke. . . (The boy is always inside,
because. . . )
# pro
3SG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPERF
[
[
waawa-nm⊕
mosquito-ERG
poo-c’oox’coox’-no’qa
3/3-suck.on-MODAL
pro
3SG
c’alawi
if
pro
3SG
ha-’at-o’qa
3SUBJ-go.out-MODAL
]
]
Intended: he thinks a mosquitononspeci f ic would bite him if he went out.
Such data show that DP⊕ may not be read non-specifically. The same requirement is
imposed here as for proleptic objects: only a classic de re reading is available.
4.3 The composition of covert raising clauses
A first desideratum for a theory of covert raising is an account of why prolepsis
and covert raising should be similar in this way. Why should there be a semantic
generalization that groups together proleptic objects (in prolepsis) and DP⊕ (in covert
raising)? A second desideratum is an account of a tight distributional connection
between these two constructions: the verbs that allow covert raising are all and only
those that also allow prolepsis. Neki ‘think’ and cuukwe ‘know’ allow both; all other
verbs (e.g. hi ‘say/tell’, q’eese’ ‘be sad (that)’) allow neither.
A response to both desiderata plausibly begins with the morphosyntactic behavior
in common between the proleptic object and DP⊕: they are the controllers of object
agreement on neki ‘think’ and cuukwe ‘know’. It is straightforward to explain why
the proleptic object should control this agreement: it occupies the object position of
a transitive, Heimian attitude verb, as in (39). Could DP⊕ also occupy this position,
at LF (and perhaps before8)? Such an account responds to the first desideratum:
DP⊕ and the proleptic object are both read de re because both occupy the object
position of a Heimian attitude verb. It also meets the second desideratum: neki
‘think’ and cuukwe ‘know’ are unique among Nez Perce attitude verbs in that they
have a Heimian denotation, providing a DP res position. An attitude verb that lacks
a denotation of this type will not allow either prolepsis or covert raising.
If this view can be sustained, the difference between prolepsis and covert raising
lies not in their LF, but rather in the syntactic derivation by which this LF is produced.
In one case but not the other, the object position of the attitude verb is filled by a
base-generated DP. And indeed there is syntactic reason to think that DP⊕ moves
covertly out of its clause, into the matrix, as this analysis requires. We find island
effects (missing in prolepsis, e.g. (52)) reappearing in cases of covert raising:
8 I propose in Deal (2017b) that the covert movement of DP⊕ is ordinary syntactic movement subject
to lower copy pronunciation (rather than post-syntactic movement). Cp. Fox & Nissenbaum (1999).
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(51) * ’aayat-onm
woman-ERG
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-TAM
[CP
[
[ad junct
[
ke kaa
when
mamay’ac⊕
children.NOM
hi-pa-paay-no’
3SUBJ-S.PL-arrive-FUT
],
],
hi-lloy-no’
3SUBJ-be.happy-FUT
qiiwn
old.man.NOM
].
]
Intended: the woman thinks that when the kids arrive, the old man will be
happy.
(52) ’aayat-onm
woman-ERG
mamay’ac-na
children-ACC
hi-nees-nek-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-think-TAM
[CP
[
[ad junct
[
ke kaa
when
pro
3PL
hi-pa-paay-no’ ],
3SBJ-S.PL-arrive-FUT],
hi-lloy-no’
3SUBJ-be.happy-FUT
qiiwn
old.man.NOM
]
]
The woman thinks that when the kids arrive, the old man will be happy.
For two further, purely syntactic arguments in favor of positing (A-)movement
into the matrix clause for covert raising, I refer the reader to Deal 2017b. Here, for
reasons of space, I will simply move ahead with the consequences of these arguments
for the question of how covert raising clauses are composed. In the LF for a covert
raising sentence, DP⊕ occupies the same position as a proleptic object; it serves
as the semantic argument to a transitive, Heimian attitude verb. Thus the LFs of
prolepsis and covert raising are entirely the same (modulo the difference, if any,
in the embedded clause between a trace left by covert raising vs. the independent
pronoun used in prolepsis):
(53) Mary-nim
Mary-ERG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-TAM
[
[
Calvin-nim⊕
Calvin-ERG
pee-cepeqick-e
3/3-catch-TAM
’ek’eex-ne
magpie-ACC
].
]
Mary thinks Calvin caught a magpie.
(54) VP
CP
TP
t1 caught a magpie
1
V
thinkde re
DPres
Calvin
DPatt holder
Mary
It might be noted that this derivation (like previous res-movement accounts, e.g.
Heim 1994) involves an instance of movement to θ -position. Movement does not
create an abstraction right below the landing site, or indeed, any abstractor at all.
(The abstractor present on the edge of the embedded clause in (54) is the same
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base-generated abstractor found in prolepsis (39).) Rather, the abstraction needed
for semantic integration of the moved argument is provided by the verb itself. I
would like to suggest that the central role of the verb denotation here provides an
explanation for why there is no scopal reconstruction possible in covert raising.
To account for familiar cases where a quantificational DP A-moves over a modal
predicate but is scopally interpreted below that predicate – e.g., in the Missing Twin
scenario from (22), sentence (55) – we might appeal to either high-typed traces
(semantic reconstruction) or deletion of copies (syntactic reconstruction):
(55) A twin seems t to be missing. Possible reading: seems > ∃
Neither mechanism applies straightforwardly in a structure like (54). If the higher
copy of DP⊕ is deleted, the attitude verb fails to obtain all its arguments (and a
propositional meaning will not be produced at VP). Moreover, the lower copy of
DP⊕ will not provide a variable, and so the abstraction in the embedded clause will
be vacuous (which is ruled out in (36)). On the other hand, if the embedded trace
(and its binder) are GQ type, the embedded clause will not be able to compose with
the attitude verb. Both problems trace back to the denotation of the transitive attitude
verb, (34). In order to produce a low-scope reading for DP⊕, we would need to
substitute a different verbal lexical entry – something that reconstruction cannot do.
5 De re in situ
The covert raising derivation for de re LFs proposed in the previous section is in
two basic ways reminiscent of Heim’s res-movement account of (temporal) de re in
English: the res moves into the matrix clause, and this movement is covert. At the
same time, the movement in question is different from classic res-movement in that
it is, in general, syntactically far better behaved. First, it targets an independently
motivated position (in which proleptic objects can appear). Second, it is constrained
by argument structure (only one res position is available per verb). Third, it is limited
by islands and (as shown in Deal 2017b) by A-intervention, like other A-movement.
Of course, classic res-movement views are unconstrained in all these ways
because of what the data are like. De re readings are not limited to exactly one
res per attitude verb, nor by islands or other syntactic constraints. These and other
considerations (e.g. Charlow & Sharvit 2014) favor an approach for English that
eschews res-movement: the res argument remains in situ inside CP, and de re
interpretation is derived with the help of concept generators (Percus & Sauerland
2003, Anand 2006, Charlow & Sharvit 2014, Pearson 2015) or similar technology
(Ninan 2012). This is what I have called ‘Method 1’ for de re interpretation. In this
section I will make the case that Method 1 LFs are available in Nez Perce, too.
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We begin with the observation that Nez Perce never requires a prolepsis/covert
raising strategy for de re. Consider, for instance, the context for prolepsis example
(16) and covert raising example (45), repeated in (56). Simple intransitive CP
complementation is fully possible in this case:
(56) Magpie context: My neighbor Mary sees a cat catching a magpie. It turns
out it was my cat, Calvin, but Mary doesn’t know that. She just tells me about
the fight and what the cat looked like. When I get home, Calvin is there and
he’s all dirty and messed up. To explain what happened I say:
Mary
Mary.NOM
hi-neki-se
3SUBJ-think-TAM
[
[
Calvin-nim
Calvin-ERG
pee-cepeqick-e
3/3-catch-TAM
’ek’eex-ne
magpie-ACC
].
]
Mary thinks Calvin caught a magpie.
The analysis here is unlikely to feature covert res-movement – the morphosyntactic
signatures are missing. (There is no ergative on the matrix subject, nor object
agreement on the attitude verb.) From a surface perspective, the de re reading here is
totally unmarked. And this example is unexceptional in allowing an unmarked de
re reading: simple CP complementation in Nez Perce freely allows both de re and
de dicto readings, just as in English. Intransitive CP complementation is thus fully
felicitous in all of the scenarios discussed in sections 3.2 and 4.2.
The overall syntactic generalization about de re readings for material other than
proleptic objects/DP⊕ seems to be that they are entirely syntactically unconstrained.
For instance, while there can be only one proleptic object/DP⊕ per attitude verb,
multiple de re is fully possible:9
(57) Context: My new neighbor sees a cat chasing a dog around my yard and she
tells me what she saw. I know that it must have been Calvin, the cat, and
Fido, the dog – my neighbor doesn’t know that though. (She doesn’t know
what the animals are called.)
pro
3SG
hi-neki-se
3SUBJ-think-IMPERF
[
[
Calvin-nim
Calvin-ERG
pee-tw’ehke’yk-saqa
3/3-chase-TAM
Fido-ne
Fido-ACC
].
]
She thinks Calvin was chasing Fido.
And de re readings are possible in islands, e.g. in (58) with an adjunct island:
9 Multiple de re is also possible in a prolepsis or covert raising sentence, so long as only one res is
treated syntactically as the proleptic object/DP⊕. Doing justice to this possibility requires an update
to the analysis of the Heimian attitude verb in (34): if we handle de re in situ via concept generators,
the verb must both introduce a res position and quantify over concept generators.
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(58) Context: Laurie’s cat is lost, so she goes around showing people his picture
and asking if they’ve seen him. Her neighbor around the block says he’ll call
if he sees the cat. The cat’s name is Snow (Meeqe’), but the neighbor does
not know this.
pro
3SG
kiye
1PL.INCL.CL
hi-nees- /0-n-e
3SUBJ-O.PL-tell-P-REM.PAST
[
[
pro
1SG
’eetx
2PL.CL
cew’cew’-nu’
call-FUT
[ad junct
[
c’alawi
if
pro
1SG
Meeqe’-ne
Snow-ACC
’e-ex-nu’
3OBJ-see-FUT
]
] ]
He told us he’d call us if he sees Snow.
The overall absence of morphosyntactic effects or constraints here is directly parallel
to English, but in contrast with the marked strategies for de re in Nez Perce.
This contrast points to two conclusions. First, if constraints on de re ex situ like
the 1-res-position limit directly reflect the ingredients present at LF (in particular,
the denotation of the verb), the absence of these constraints for de re in situ calls for
different LF ingredients. The conclusion is that two LF mechanisms give rise to de
re reports in Nez Perce. Second, so far as unmarked de re is concerned, a learner
of Nez Perce has the same type of language-internal morphosyntactic evidence
about what is happening at LF as a learner of English does – namely none at all.
I conclude that, given the case for an in situ mechanism for (unmarked) de re in
English, the null hypothesis should be that unmarked de re in Nez Perce features an
in situ mechanism, too.
A final piece of evidence in favor of positing two distinct LFs for de re in Nez
Perce comes from an interaction with indexical shift. As documented in Deal (2014,
2018), Nez Perce allows indexical shift; shifty readings are available under ‘think’
and ‘know’ (and ‘say’). A shifted indexical may be clausemate with a term read de
re, as we see in (59) (as well as (58) above). Here the embedded subject is Calvin,
read de re, and the embedded object is a shifty 1st person pronoun.
(59) Context: My neighbor Mary complains to me that a cat has been digging
up her flowers. She tells me about the cat and it sounds like it was my cat
Calvin, even though Mary doesn’t know what cat it was.
pro
3SG
hi-neki-se
3SUBJ-think-TAM
[
[
Calvin-nim
Calvin-ERG
hi-p’li-yay’-sa
3SBJ-dig-µ-TAM
pro
1SG
laatis
flower.NOM
].
literally: Shei thinks Calvin is digging up myi flowers.
The example features intransitive CP complementation. If indexical shift reflects
a shifty operator in the left periphery of CP (as I have argued in other work, and
following Anand & Nevins 2004), this operator must be compatible with the LF
ingredients needed for de re in situ – e.g. binding of concept generator variables.
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But notably, indexical shift is typically degraded when combined with prolepsis or
covert raising:
(60) Context: same.
?? Meeli-nim
Mary-ERG
pee-nek-se
3/3-think-IMPERF
[
[
Calvin-nim
Calvin-ERG
hi-p’li-yay’-sa
3SUBJ-dig-µ-IMPERF
pro
1SG
laatis
flower.NOM
].
Intended: Maryi thinks Calvin is digging up myi flowers.
This contrast confirms that unmarked de re is not merely a different phonological
cast on the same basic LF. Rather, de re ex situ, in contrast to de re in situ, requires
LF ingredients (e.g. the CP-edge abstractor) which are incompatible with shifty
operators.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I have argued that attitude reports de re may arise from two distinct
types of LF, produced derivationally in three ways. One type features an attitude
verb taking the res as its semantic argument. In Nez Perce, such LFs may be derived
by prolepsis or by covert raising. The second type features a res argument which
is syntactically unconnected to the attitude verb, where the relation at a distance is
mediated by technology such as concept generators. Such LFs are the predominant
if not only way to produce de re readings in English, and are possible in Nez Perce
as well. Internal to a single natural language, then, attitude reports de re may be
derived in two distinct ways.
I will conclude by drawing attention to two particular places where the investiga-
tion of de re in Nez Perce casts additional light on compositional questions. First, the
Nez Perce data show that natural language does indeed allow for covert movement to
a res position – but only when this movement respects syntactic constraints imposed
on movement generally. This suggests that covert operations are in general subject to
the same principles as other syntactic operations, and therefore, that any additional
pathways to de re that are yet to be discovered are likely to also be those that are
syntactically well-behaved. Second, it is curious that in English, Nez Perce, and a
great many well-known languages besides, there is no necessary morphosyntactic
signature of de re. Unmarked de re may be a language universal. If the universal
holds, the theory of de re in situ should account for the absence of marking – why
are concept generators never obligatorily overt?
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